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Kenya has long had a reputation of being politically risky, manifested in corruption, uncertainty about policies, and the importance of political connections in doing business. Kenya began its economic liberalization in 1993. Reform picked up speed after a tightening of aid by donors on governance grounds and an attempt to re-establish credibility following the costly Goldenberg scandal uncovered in 1992. But tangible results in the shape of favorable government debt dynamics and a pick up in growth took a decade to materialize. The paper argues that the peaceful presidential election and transfer of power in December 2002 was central to the economic upswing after 2002. The subsequent decline in political risk was singled out by the private sector as an This paper-a joint product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, Africa Region, and the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network-is a background paper for the Country Economic Memorandum on economic growth in Kenya. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lbandiera@worldbank.org, bpinto2@ worldbank.org and pkumar1@worldbank.org. important development. The paper draws on an analysis of debt dynamics, the evolution of domestic interest rates, and the latest Investment Climate Assessment to present evidence on the criticality of low political risk in facilitating good economic outcomes after 2003. The December 2007 elections have highlighted other aspects of political risk-ethnic and social tensions with roots in inequality. The findings of this paper underline the importance of establishing a foundation for long-term political stability and social cohesion in view of the disruptions following the December 2007 elections. This process is likely to be at least as difficult and lengthy as fundamental economic policy and institutional reform.
1.

Introduction
For decades, Kenya has suffered from low and volatile economic growth-per capita real GDP growth averaged 1.2 percent over the period 1960-2000, overwhelmed by a standard deviation of 4.8 percent.
3 More recently, notwithstanding deeply-entrenched skepticism, Kenya has done well on growth and macroeconomic stabilization. Over the four years 2003-2006, growth averaged 4.9 percent in contrast to virtual stagnation between 1991 and 2002. 4 Inflation remained relatively contained at an average 9 percent, but more convincingly, the ratio of government debt-to-GDP fell by 5.8 percentage points per year over this period as interest rates fell and growth picked up. These impressive developments fueled optimism that Kenya might at last be turning the corner and embarking on a path of sustained growth and poverty reduction.
However, the violent and disruptive aftermath of the Presidential elections of December 2007
have placed such optimism on hold.
Objectives and Background
Kenya's reputation has been overshadowed to such an extent by its image of being corrupt and weakly governed that it might come as a surprise that serious reform began as early as 1993. We highlight the crucial role played by declining political risk after 2002 in at last bringing the reforms implemented by Kenya over the previous decade to fruition. The EIU quotes convey the image of corruption and political instability, a combination normally associated with stagnation, bad public finances and a poor investment climate. The S&P quotes contain good news on stability and growth but caution that infrastructure is deficient and governance a weakness. We will not try to explain this disconnection in perceptions separated by only a few months but will instead present evidence on a perceptible change for the better in Kenya's macroeconomic outcomes starting in 2003/04. The first step in this study was to attempt an explanation for the puzzling observation that real interest rates on Kenyan treasury bills were surprisingly low, of the order of 1-3 percent. How could a corrupt and politically unstable country (recall the EIU quotes) have such low interest rates? The possibility of manipulation was rejected because Kenya has a fully convertible currency and an open capital account. If interest rates were being kept artificially low, there would be downward pressure on both the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves; but the opposite was true. When we asked officials or the private sector why interest rates were so low, the standard reply was "Because government's borrowing requirements have come down."
However, a review of the government's debt dynamics strongly suggests that borrowing requirements came down because interest rates fell substantially, not the other way round.
Indeed, with the primary fiscal balance having shrunk and concerns about the composition of public spending, the only factor which could explain the big fall in interest rates was a decline in country or political risk. 7 Informal interviews with businessmen supported this idea. The encouraging refrain was: "We no longer need political connections to do business in Kenya." In addition, it was noted that investments and business would continue regardless of the outcome of the then-upcoming Presidential elections. In order to obtain systematic evidence on perceptions of politics and business, questions were added to the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) conducted in June 2007. We report these results in section 5.
Main Findings and Organization of the Paper
Serious data deficiencies-in particular, the availability of a consistent GDP series only after 1995/96-are an impediment to an analysis requiring long time series. Our strategy therefore is to persuade the reader by "connecting the dots" among the extent of past reform; a review of the evolution of government indebtedness (measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio) and its underlying determinants; a decomposition of interest rates to gauge devaluation and default risk;
and the survey results from the ICA. We conclude that the positive trends after 2003 were being driven by three factors:
• lagged benefits of price, trade, exchange rate and interest rate liberalization forced by reduced aid after the Goldenberg scandal uncovered in 1992;
• solid foundation for solvency based on significant revenue collection as a payoff to the reform of tax policy and administration which started in the mid-1990s; and critically, and poverty alleviation will eventually depend upon Kenya's ability to engender political stability and social harmony for a prolonged period; experience from countries as disparate as China, India and Vietnam suggests that such stability is needed for a minimum 10-15 years for positive trends to take hold. 8 The reasoning is that irrespective of the political system, good governance and stability in the rules of the game for a long period are needed for having well-managed public finances, investor confidence and hence long-run growth.
Section 2 sketches out an analytical framework which underpins the subsequent presentation of empirical evidence. Section 3 contains a snapshot of Kenya's economic liberalization dating to 1993. Section 4 analyses government debt dynamics, discussing key facets such as revenue mobilization and expenditure composition. While impressive strides have been made towards an efficient revenue system based on broad-based taxes, the composition of expenditure remains a serious constraint on growth. Specifically, spending on infrastructure is inadequate. Section 5 presents evidence on declining country and political risk based on a decomposition of interest rates and perceptions from Investment Climate Assessments. Section 6 discusses challenges-economic and political-looking ahead.
Analytical Framework
A reduction in political risk could have a growth dividend through two channels: at the macro level, a reduction in real interest rates which improves government debt dynamics and contributes to stabilization; and at the micro level, a lengthening of business horizons with its corollaries of lower hurdle rates of return for investment projects and greater private investment.
We start with the micro channel using a slight adaptation of the model in Razin and Sadka (2004) .
The representative competitive firm invests in line with the following Bellman equation:
the initial net capital stock (δ is the rate of depreciation, K 0 the inherited capital stock), K the chosen capital stock for the current period, t the current tax rate, r the world interest rate, θ a political (country) risk premium external to the firm and τ the future tax rate. The parameter α captures the investment horizon or equivalently the importance given to the future. We assume 1 0 ≤ ≤ α with a higher value connoting a longer horizon. The first order condition is:
We now mimic a short-horizon situation by setting 0 = α . Equation (1) gets modified as follows:
Note that the RHS of (2) is the maximum value of the RHS of (1) for a given world interest rate and country risk premium. In other words, when the horizon is short the hurdle rate for private investment is set at its maximum so that the investment can be recouped in short order. This is likely to coincide with a high country risk premium,θ . Now consider the polar opposite case of 0 = = 9 For a derivation, see Razin and Sadka (2004)-equation (1) is the same as their equation (2) 
Comparing the RHS of equation (3) with that of (2), we see a substantial decline in the hurdle rate of return for investment.
10 Figure 1 summarizes these possibilities. Long horizon + Tax cuts
The figure shows three levels of the optimal capital stock decisions, K 1 <K 2 <K 3 , corresponding to a short horizon (with high political risk), a long horizon (with reduced political risk) and a long horizon reinforced by cuts in the marginal tax rate. In the case of a short horizon and high political risk, there is the danger that θ δ Turning to the macro, few economists would quarrel with the proposition that macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustained economic growth and a good investment climate. However, the focus has shifted (especially after the most recent emerging market public debt crises which began in 1997-98 and ended with the Argentine default of 2001) from short-run fiscal deficits and inflation to balance in the government's intertemporal budget constraint.
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Satisfying this constraint rests on the capacity to eventually generate adequate primary fiscal surpluses, which in turn depends upon future growth and tax collection.
12 Two key points emerging from recent empirical work are that balancing the government's intertemporal budget calls for (i) a comprehensive approach to managing the public finances. Paying attention to primary deficits, real interest rates and growth rates is not enough-equally important are bailouts and contingent liabilities, the efficiency and predictability of taxation, expenditure composition and the rate of return on public investments; and (ii) sound macro-micro linkages. 13 We briefly sketch the latter and make the connection with political risk.
Define government net worth as the present value of future primary surpluses (expressed as a ratio of GDP) minus the initial government debt-to-GDP ratio. 14 Since the discount rate is the real interest rate minus the real growth rate (assumed to be positive for convergence), a reduction in interest rates as a result of reduced political risk will unambiguously increase net worth and strengthen government solvency. What about an accompanying reduction in tax rates? This will have two opposing effects: it will tend to lower revenues and hence the present value of primary 11 The framework which dominated IFI policy thinking on macroeconomics and growth until 1997 might well have been Fischer (1993) . 12 Solvency requires that the present value of future primary surpluses (discounted at a rate equal to the real interest rate minus the real growth rate) equal or exceed the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. 13 See IMF (2003), Budina and Fiess (2005) , Gill and Pinto (2005) . 14 See Serven (2007) . 8 surpluses; but it will tend to raise private investment and hence growth especially in conjunction with a fall in political risk (increasing the capital stock to K 3 in Figure 1 ). The combination of rising growth and lower interest rates will in turn exert an upward effect on net worth which could in principle offset the effect of a fall in revenues. Besides, the fall in revenue could be curtailed by improving tax administration which increases the tax base and thus partially or completely offsets the impact of lower marginal tax rates.
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Now consider government capital expenditure. If it is cut, the immediate effect will be to raise primary surpluses and improve debt dynamics; but net worth could decrease as a result of a fall in long-run growth (via complementary reductions in private investment). This in turn could trigger a rise in interest rates if initial indebtedness is high and tax revenues fall with growth. Of course, if capital expenditure is of low quality, a cut would be unambiguously beneficial. In
Kenya's case as we shall see, the reduction in interest rates and cut in marginal tax rates have contributed to an accelerated decline in indebtedness (government debt-to-GDP ratio) after 2003; but growth diagnostics indicate that more public spending is needed to alleviate the infrastructure constraint on private investment. The challenge therefore is to choose infrastructure projects with high rates of return which will ensure that the government's net worth is protected. 16 However, in line with the main point of this paper, this is secondary to managing political risk.
Kenya's Economic Liberalization: A Snapshot
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The economic liberalization started with Sessional Paper Number 1 of January 1986, when the government decided to shift from dirigisme to freeing up the economy. By the late 1980s, Kenya had adopted a managed float. Then a series of incidents intervened after the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989 and Kenya began to lose its geopolitical bargaining power (as 15 Many developing countries offer the prospect of raising average effective tax rates (and hence total revenues) even when marginal tax rates are cut by enlarging the tax base through better administration. 16 A detailed analytical discussion is contained in Serven (2007) . 17 Sources: Meetings with academicians, private sector firms, IMF files.
it was the most prominent market economy in the region and the US fleet was able to use Mombasa port). Here is a brief timeline:
• Nov 1991: Emphasis in Consultative Group shifts abruptly from economics to governance.
Donors freeze aid.
• Jan 1992: IMF refuses to go to its Board with an unfinanced gap. The World Bank pulls back loans in response.
• 1992: Kenya starts building up external debt arrears; foreign exchange becomes the critical constraint.
• there was a debt rescheduling. As a result, domestic borrowing served not only to finance the deficit but also pay off maturing external debt.
Two points are worth noting. First, the hardening of the donors' stance on governance grounds and the need to re-establish credibility in the wake of Goldenberg were major spurs to 18 Goldenberg International was set up in 1990 to export gold and diamond jewelry from Kenya in return for a 35 percent premium on the exchange rate in contrast to the normal premium of 20 percent for exporters. Little or no gold was actually exported; a scheme was established to round-trip the sale of export dollars to the Central Bank of Kenya (essentially, buy dollars at the official exchange rate, sell them back at a 35 percent premium as "gold exports" and then repeat the process). It was finally uncovered in 1992. Warutere (2005) . 
Government Debt Dynamics
A key requirement for macro stabilization noted in section 2 is balance in the government's intertemporal budget constraint, for which a sufficient condition is that public debt be on a sustainable trajectory, i.e., there is no need for a drastic change in fiscal policies to rein in indebtedness. If intertemporal balance is not assured, there will be a tendency for macroeconomic uncertainty to increase, engendering expectations of rising inflation and interest rates, which will slow down private investment and growth. Governments borrow when they run fiscal deficits, which can be decomposed into the primary fiscal deficit and interest payments.
The path of the debt-to-GDP ratio is then determined by the primary deficit and a term proportional to the difference between the real interest rate and the real growth rate. If the primary deficit is positive and large, and real interest rates exceed growth rates, then the debt-to-GDP ratio will grow until corrective action is taken or a crisis-typically involving a burst of inflation and/or a disruptive debt default-forces such action. Debt can also increase when the government issues recapitalization bonds to bail out banks or takes over the guaranteed loans of loss-making parastatals, while the opposite happens when government assets are privatized.
Box 1 summarizes difficulties encountered in assembling the debt data as well as data on macro variables more generally, while Figure 2 shows the path of Kenya's debt-to-GDP ratio and its currency composition over the past 11 years. The government debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen by Eventually, the choice fell on the data published by the MoF as better documented, consistent with monthly data published by CBK and consistent with past external borrowing requirements from the fiscal accounts.
Also, the collection of macro aggregates proved difficult. In 2005, the Central Bureau of Statistics updated the methodology for estimating GDP so as to better capture the contribution of services in the economy. The published series now goes back only to 1996, preventing a longer time series on the debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, data on key macroeconomic variables such as the fiscal accounts, balance of payments, interest rates, prices and exchange rates are difficult to find from the same source on a consistent basis (i.e. IMF staff reports or GDF), for years before 1996. The fall in interest payments (and interest rates, as we shall see later) even as the primary deficit was rising (primary surplus shrinking) is puzzling. A plausible explanation is that the 20 See the country case studies in Budina and Fiess (2005) . It also contains a derivation of the flow budget constraint of the government forming the basis for the decomposition shown in Table 1 . 21 Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent GDP series for pre-1995. Earlier numbers showed government interest payments to be as high as 10-12 percent of GDP in the aftermath of Goldenberg.
14 1991-93 Goldenberg scandal engendered a great deal of macroeconomic volatility and left little option but to raise the primary surplus sharply; and both the primary surplus and interest payments then gradually returned to 'normal' levels. The Goldenberg scandal is estimated to have cost $600 million to $1 billion, some 9 to 16 percent of 1994 GDP (Warutere 2005 ). Efforts to mop-up excessive monetary infusion arising from the scandal pushed interest rates on T-bills to over 80 percent (Figure 8 below) . Kenya was also forced to shift to domestic debt to pay off maturing external debt as a result of the accompanying aid squeeze. A large increase in the primary fiscal surplus was engineered in an attempt to bolster credibility and a significant liberalization was set in train. Import licenses were abolished in May 1993, a unified, marketbased exchange rate adopted in November 1993 and exchange controls lifted in May 1994. The era of price controls ended in 1994. As a result of this freeing up, foreign exchange flowed in, helping drive interest rates down. 22 Thus, positive macroeconomic benefits started appearing before 2002 but growth stagnated.
A second possible explanation for falling interest rates in spite of the fall in the primary surplus is that the latter was driven by adjustments in fiscal policy designed to support private investment and long-run growth. This could happen for example if marginal tax rates were cut and/or public spending to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks were raised. In the short run, this would reduce the primary surplus but with the promise of better prospects for long-run growth and tax collection, as discussed in section 2. Countering this is the argument that markets tend to be myopic and that the quality of Kenya's past public investments has been low-which would strengthen the argument that interest rates fell because of reduced political risk rather than market perceptions of higher government net worth. Revenue mobilization is now discussed, followed by expenditure composition.
22 Source: Interview with Kenyan academics.
Revenue Mobilization
We shall show that Kenya has managed a successful transition from a high tax rate, low tax base system with considerable reliance on import taxes and seigniorage to a more efficient and equitable revenue system based on broad-based taxes like income tax and VAT. This accomplishment is considered difficult to achieve-countries marked by political instability, social division and weak governance, which is the stereotypical image of Kenya, are more likely to rely on seigniorage and import tariffs, taxes which are relatively easy to collect but highly distortionary, and probably regressive in the case of seigniorage.
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The rise in the primary surplus in the wake of Goldenberg was achieved in part by raising tax rates. This plus high inflation boosted the tax take and pushed the revenue-to-GDP ratio to about 25 percent in the early-to-mid 1990s. 24 It was felt that maintaining such a high rate of revenue mobilization would deter growth, so tax rates were cut and the revenue-to-GDP target design, given the trade liberalization policy. Income tax displays a u-shaped pattern, falling in the late 1990s, but then, unlike import duty, recovering over the last three years. This is encouraging to the extent that it captures lower tax rates combined with a broadening of the tax base and 23 Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992 Likewise, Figure 6 shows that the effective import tariff rate and the share of import duties in total revenues, which were at peak levels after Goldenberg, have both come down sharply. The immediate impact of cutting import tariffs would be to increase the primary deficit (as we have seen) and lower the cost of imported machinery and raw materials as well as the tax on exports by Lerner symmetry. In combination with cuts in income tax rates, which raise the private returns to capital, the cut in import tariffs would increase competition from imports, spurring both more investment and higher productivity in firms, improving growth prospects. • Firms noted that reductions in import tariffs had spurred exports because it had lowered their costs, exactly as Lerner symmetry would predict. One firm described this as decisive in doubling its capacity in 2003, even more important than the fall in interest rates.
• All firms mentioned pressures to increase efficiency and productivity by reducing waste and technological upgrading because of greater competition and falling profit margins as a consequence of lower import barriers. Many mentioned adopting Gemba Kaizen techniques to reduce waste, get workers more involved in preventive maintenance and doing things better on the shop floor. a/ One multinational said it had reduced manufacturing unit costs by 30-40 percent in spite of rising labor and energy costs.
• Kenyan labor was typically described as well-educated and the best in the region.
• While the increased competition has not so far led to bankruptcies, the expectation was voiced that loss-making parastatals will eventually close.
In short: competition and hard budget constraints are forcing firms to become more efficient and innovative, while the increased incentive for exports is spurring capacity expansion.
a/ Gemba Kaizen in Japanese means change for the better (kaizen) in the workplace (gemba). It was originated by Masaaki Imai, a Japanese management consultant, who established the Kaizen Institute in 1986.
A point worth making is that in spite of the cut in VAT, income tax and import tariff rates, which contributed to the decline in revenues since the mid-1990s till 2001/02, the revenueto-GDP ratio at around 21 percent is still high in Kenya compared to other countries of a similar income level. Kenya collects at least 4-7 percentage points of GDP more in revenue than its EAC partners, Tanzania and Uganda, and is a positive outlier among developing countries.
Expenditure Composition
The major complaint voiced by the private sector pertains to the quantity and quality of infrastructure. Roads in particular are singled out-the fuel levy has not translated into better roads. 26 This brings us to the Achilles' heel of the Kenyan public finances: expenditure policy. The challenge therefore is to scale-up spending in order to maintain and rehabilitate infrastructure while ensuring the quality of investment portfolio. This challenge needs to be seen in conjunction with the competing demand for social spending, which has been increasing at a fast pace following the adoption of free primary education in 2003 and various health goals by the government.
Political Stability and the Country Risk Premium
Interviews with private sector and participants in financial markets show that 2003 was considered a watershed year. The change in political leadership was seen as the culmination of a successful transition to multi-party democracy, a process that began in 1992. It was widely believed that Kenya's political development was irreversible and economic policies unlikely to change dramatically with changes in political leadership. 29 In other words, there was a decline in perceived political and economic risk by investors. Since Kenya has no exchange controls, the following formal construct can help shed light on risks:
where is the nominal interest rate on Kenyan government T-bills (denominated in Kenyan shillings), is that on US government T-bills (denominated in USD) and is the target devaluation rate for the KSh/USD exchange rate. This is standard interest parity. Risk could arise on two counts: suppose the market believes the eventual depreciation rate will turn out higher than that (explicitly or implicitly) targeted by the central bank, CBK. It will then demand a devaluation risk premium, DRP, to compensate for this. Suppose it also believes, given
Kenya's image of political instability and weak governance that the government could default on its debt. It would then demand a sovereign or default risk premium, SRP, to compensate for this.
The SRP could be regarded as a function of Kenya's credit and inflation history, its political risk and the quality of its fiscal and financial institutions. 1991M7 1992M4 1993M1 1993M1 1994M7 1995M4 1996M1 1996M1 1997M7 1998M4 1999M1 1999M1 2000M7 2001M4 2002M1 2002M1 2003M7 2004M4 2005M1 2005M1 2006M7 2007M4 91-Day Tbill (%) In Table 2 , the difference between US T-bill and Kenyan T-bill rates has fallen sharply What is exceptional when Kenya's experience is stacked against that of even emerging market countries is its ability to issue nominal (i.e., un-indexed) local currency debt at single-digit interest rates when countries such as Brazil and Turkey have had great difficulty in doing so in spite of running significant primary surpluses (far greater than Kenya's) for several years in a row (Brazil since 1999) . This indicates a high degree of macro policy credibility and the absence of "debt intolerance" (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003) . Further, Kenya's debt structure is less vulnerable to external shocks as a result of the falling share of external debt over the past decade.
Finally, Kenya's debt dynamics are favorable and it has been growing impressively over the past three years in contrast to the debt sustainability problems and slow growth in many of the emerging market countries.
In January 2008, following post-election violence, S&P downgraded Kenya's long-term local currency rating to B+ from its earlier level of BB-and long-term foreign currency to B from B+, five levels below investment grade.
Survey Evidence from the Investment Climate Assessment
What would be the implications of greater confidence and lower country risk? One would expect to see firms more willing to reinvest profits instead of depositing these in an overseas bank account. One would also expect investment horizons to lengthen, so that the hurdle rate for investments goes down. 34 Indeed, the rising political and macroeconomic stability 33 The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded external debt instruments in the emerging markets. In addition to serving as a benchmark, the EMBI+ provides investors with a definition of the market for emerging markets external-currency debt, a list of the instruments traded, and a compilation of their terms. The EMBI+ tracks instruments mainly from the three major Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), reflecting the size and liquidity of these external debt markets. The non-Latin countries are represented in the index by Bulgaria, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Russia, and South Africa. 
Challenges Looking Ahead: Concluding Remarks
The economic policy challenge for Kenya is to consolidate macroeconomic stabilization while continuing to accelerate growth. There are two ways of describing this challenge:
1. Increasing spending on the social sectors and infrastructure without compromising government solvency 2. Raising the rate of return to private capital while lowering the cost of capital.
The good news in challenge 1 is that Kenya does not appear to have a debt sustainability problem and therefore has more latitude in generating 'fiscal space' for infrastructure and social spending, than many MICs with such a problem, which has severely constrained their fiscal space options. 37 Its debt dynamics have been especially favorable for the past 4 years as shown above and real interest rates have been low. With indebtedness on a steady decline over the past 10 years, the key question that policymakers need to ask is whether this trend should be preserved or whether an alternative goal may be socially more desirable, such as either keeping the government debt-to-GDP ratio constant or even letting it rise in the short-run while the infrastructure constraint is alleviated. The key point is to select infrastructure projects with high economic rates of return and ensure that infrastructure services are priced at a cost-recovery level.
This together with any acceleration in growth as a result of relaxing the infrastructure constraint on private investment should ensure that over the long-term, the additional public investments pay for themselves. Resources can also be released for higher infrastructure investment through more efficient spending. For example, an ongoing study shows that the quality of roads portfolio can be improved by selecting projects with higher economic returns. There is also scope for curtailing waste through more efficient procurement. Similarly, in the education sector, better allocation of the time of existing teachers will help in financing the ongoing expansion on a fiscally sustainable basis while improving the quality of education outcomes.
37 See for example Gill and Pinto (2005) .
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Challenge 2 is related to challenge 1 in that relaxing the infrastructure constraint will raise the return to private capital. In addition to macroeconomic stabilization, a crucial factor for keeping interest rates and the cost of capital low is political stability, which will also lengthen private investment horizons and thus the threshold rate of return for investment projects. We conclude by discussing this political stability challenge, which has superseded the economic policy challenge. This challenge promises to be at least as difficult as that of policy and institutional reform.
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